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In intermediate goods markets, both buyers and sellers normally
have market power, and sales are based on bilaterally negotiated con-
tracts specifying both price and quantity. In our model, pairs of buyers
and sellers meet in bilateral but interdependent Rubinstein-Ståhl ne-
gotiations. The outcome has a simple characterization (a Nash equilib-
rium in Nash bargaining solutions) suitable for applied work. Equilib-
rium quantities are eﬃcient regardless of concentration and also with
few “trading links”. The law of one price does not hold. In addition to
relation-speciﬁc characteristics, prices depend on both upstream and
downstream concentration and on the structure of trading links. The
requirements necessary for Walrasian prices are stronger than usually
believed.
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11 Introduction
Retailing is traditionally viewed as a industry characterized by many ﬁrms
and easy entry. Over the last forty years, however, concentration has greatly
increased. Several retail sectors are now highly concentrated as a result of
organic growth and of mergers or acquisitions. A notable example of this
is the grocery sector, where the creation of buyer groups has reinforced the
trend. In 1996 the ﬁve largest groups in Germany accounted for 83 percent of
the market. In Belgium the corresponding ﬁgure was 82 percent, and in the
Netherlands 72 percent (Dobson and Waterson, 1999). Since manufacturing
is by tradition concentrated, this implies that many intermediate goods mar-
kets today are characterized by high concentration on both the seller and the
buyer sides. As a result, buyers and sellers both exercise market power: the
market structure is that of a bilateral oligopoly.
Contracts in intermediate goods markets are usually long-term and are
negotiated bilaterally. They codify many other elements as well as price.
An estimated 80 to 90 percent of all intermediate goods are traded through
extended term contracts, often lasting one year or more. Spot markets,
organized as exchanges or auctions, are just the tiny tip of a huge market of
such one-to-one contract deals (The Economist, 2000, pp. 93-94).
Our understanding of such bilateral oligopolies is very incomplete, even
when it comes to the most basic microeconomic issues. How much is traded
on decentralized markets with high concentration on both sides? Does the
presence of market power and externalities mean that this quantity is inef-
ﬁcient? What is the price, and to what extent does the distribution of the
surplus depend on the number of buyers and sellers? Under what conditions
will buyers concentrate their purchases to a single source, and under what
conditions will they purchase from a number of diﬀerent sources?
This paper presents a model of decentralized bilateral oligopoly that cap-
tures four key institutional characteristics that are common to many interme-
diate goods markets. First, since both sides of the market are concentrated,
the ﬁrms on both sides wield market power; buyers and sellers both aﬀect the
prices at which they trade. Second, contracts are determined in decentral-
ized negotiations between pairs of buyers and sellers; these negotiations are
interdependent and the contract agreed in one negotiation constitutes part
of an equilibrium prevailing in the market as a whole.1 Third, contracts are
complex, specifying the quantity and quality of the goods or services as well
as the price. Fourth, the buyers and sellers in intermediate goods markets are
1Markets with a more centralized structure, such as auctions or exchanges, are analyzed
by McAﬀee & Hendriks (2000) and Kranton and Minehart (2000).
2both professional and well-informed parties. In the model, representatives of
upstream ﬁrms meet with representatives of downstream ﬁrms to negotiate
contracts specifying prices and quantities in simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl
bargaining characterized by complete and almost-full information.2
We show that there exists a sequential equilibrium, implying immediate
agreement on a set of contracts, one for each buyer-seller pair. Each buyer-
seller pair agrees on the quantity that maximizes the sum of the two ﬁrms’
proﬁts, all other contracts being taken as given. This condition is called
bilateral eﬃciency. They also agree on the price that splits their bilateral
surplus equally. The bilateral surplus is deﬁned as the increase in the sum of
the two ﬁrms’ proﬁts that is generated by their contract, all other contracts
being taken as given. Every contract can in fact be regarded as maximizing
an appropriately deﬁned bilateral Nash product, all other contracts being
taken as given. The equilibrium set of contracts can thus be characterized
as a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining solutions.3
The second set of results concerns market eﬃciency. If all upstream ﬁrms
bargain with all downstream ﬁrms, the equilibrium quantities are the same as
the Walrasian quantities. A bilateral oligopoly is thus socially eﬃcient inde-
pendently of market concentration, and thus despite the presence of market
power. Intuitively, since every upstream ﬁrm meets with every downstream
ﬁrm in a bilaterally eﬃcient negotiation, the marginal cost for every seller
is equal to the marginal value for every buyer. As costs and valuations are
equalized in equilibrium, the market is socially eﬃcient.
In a separate section we assume that downstream ﬁrms are also engaged
in oligopolistic interaction in the ﬁnal goods market. We show that market
power in the intermediate goods market does not cause ineﬃciencies over and
above those resulting from market power in the ﬁnal goods market.
The “link structure” is a key determinant of eﬃciency. If some of the
upstream ﬁrms cannot bargain with some of the downstream ﬁrms, the equi-
librium may not necessarily be socially eﬃcient. For example, prohibiting
international trade typically implies ineﬃciencies. With an incomplete link
structure, however, production is socially eﬃcient conditional on the zero-
quantity restrictions implied by the missing links. Moreover, full eﬃciency
only requires a few links. On average, ﬁrms only need to trade with two
2Non-cooperative models of parallel bilateral bargaining have previously been studied
by Horn and Wolinsky (1986b), Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and
Stole and Zweibel (1996). However, this literature has not considered bilateral oligopolies
with more than one ﬁrm on both sides of the market, all with bargaining power, and
price/quantity contracts.
3We thus provide a non-cooperative foundation for the reduced form used by Davidson
(1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988a), and Dobson and Waterson (1997).
3partners.
T h et h i r ds e to fr e s u l t sc o n c e r n st h ed istribution of surplus. Prices are
relation-speciﬁc, which means that the law of one price does not hold. Prices
depend on several factors, including the concentration of capital. Large ﬁrms
get better deals than small ﬁrms. It may seem surprising that a seller with
low marginal costs (large capital stock) charges higher prices than a high-
cost ﬁrm. The explanation is that the incremental cost may be higher for the
low-cost ﬁrm in equilibrium. Although the low-cost ﬁrm has a lower cost at
each output level, it produces more in equilibrium and therefore has a higher
cost at the (discrete) margin. The concentration of sales also matters. If
sellers have steeper marginal cost curves than buyers, a seller with an even
distribution of sales receives higher prices than a seller with more exclusive
sales. Since prices are determined by the parties’ incremental costs, the side
with steeper marginal costs has more to gain from trading at the margin.
If all ﬁrms are small, then all prices will be close to the Walrasian price.
The “small-size requirement,” however, is stronger than has previously been
thought. Each ﬁrm must account for a small share only of every partner’s
trading volume. Since the equilibrium is eﬃcient and since trade occurs at
Walrasian prices in a large but ﬁnite economy and without an auctioneer,
our results represent a contribution to the strategic foundations of general
equilibrium (for reviews, see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; Gale, 2000).
2T h e M o d e l
U<∞ upstream ﬁrms produce intermediate goods. D<∞ downstream
ﬁrms buy intermediate goods and sell ﬁnal goods. For simplicity we assume
that for every unit of intermediate goods, one unit of ﬁnal goods can be
produced. Contracts determine the price and quantity of intermediate goods
delivered from upstream to downstream ﬁrms. A contract at time t is a
pair cud (t)=( qud (t),p ud (t)) specifying a quantity qud (t) and a price pud (t).
A contract structure c(t) is a UD-tuple of contracts cud (t),o n ef o re v e r y
(u,d) ∈ Ω,w h e r eΩ is the set of all UD pairs of upstream and downstream
ﬁrms. Likewise q and p are the vectors of all qud and pud.W ew r i t ec\cud to
indicate the contract structure given by c for all (i,j) 6=( u,d) and cud for
(u,d). The corresponding conventions are used for vectors q and p.
The short-run cost functions are denoted by Cu (q) and Cd (q) for up-
stream ﬁrm u and downstream ﬁrm d respectively. The marginal costs
of production are positive, that is ∂Cu/∂qud > 0 and ∂Cd/∂qud > 0.A
ﬁrm’s cost is aﬀected by its own production only, that is ∂Cu/∂qij =0
if i 6= u and ∂Cd/∂qij =0if j 6= d. Production is (strictly) convex if
4all Cu (q) a r e( s t r i c t l y )c o n v e xi n{quj}
D
j=1 and all Cd (q) are (strictly) con-
vex in {qid}
U
i=1. To ensure ﬁnite production we assume convexity and that
∂2Cu/∂ (qud)
2 > 0 and ∂2Cd/∂ (qud)
2 > 0. If the intermediate goods are
homogenous, let Qu =
PD
j=1 quj and Qd =
PU
i=1 qid be the ﬁrm-aggregate
quantities.
Throughout this paper the (short-run) cost functions are assumed to sat-
isfy diseconomies of size.F i r md’s incremental cost for a single product qud
is given by Cd (q)−Cd (q\qud =0 ) ,a n dd’s incremental cost for a set of prod-




. It is assumed
that the incremental cost for a product set is smaller than the sum of the
incremental costs for the single products, that is
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for all quantity vectors q, subsets of upstream ﬁrms Υ, and cost functions
Cd. Similarly, all cost functions Cu exhibit diseconomies of size. It is easy to
show that Assumption 1 is fulﬁlled if goods are homogenous and the (short-
run) cost function has constant or decreasing returns to scale. If goods are
diﬀerentiated, the assumption is fulﬁlled if for example the marginal cost of
producing one product is non-decreasing in the quantity of other products
produced (all cross-derivatives are non-negative). The role of the assump-
tion is to guarantee that proﬁts are non-negative in equilibrium. Moreover,
any ﬁrm’s incremental proﬁt, for any subset of products, is non-negative in
equilibrium.
The per-period proﬁt of an upstream ﬁrm u and a downstream ﬁrm d is










(rid (q(t)) − pid (t))qid (t) − Cd (q(t)), (2b)
where rid (q) is the price (inverse demand) for qid in the ﬁnal goods market.
For the sake of expositional simplicity we assume that downstream ﬁrms take
all retail prices rid = r>0 as given. (This assumption is relaxed in Section
5.) Total proﬁt is the discounted sum of per-period proﬁts (2a) and (2b),
with the common discount factor δ.
The bilateral surplus of a seller-buyer pair (u,d) is the additional aggre-
gate proﬁto ft h et w oﬁrms as generated by their contract, all other contracts
5taken as given, i.e.
[π
u (c\cud)+πd (c\cud)] − [π
u (c\(0,0)) + πd (c\(0,0))]. (3)
The bilateral surplus does not depend on pud.
Second, the quantity qud is bilaterally eﬃcient if it maximizes the bilateral
surplus of (u,d). For a set of seller-buyer pairs Ω ⊆ Ω,a n daﬁxed contract
structure c,l e tN (c,Ω) ⊂ R
U×D
+ denote the set of bilaterally eﬃcient quantity
vectors, where qud is bilaterally eﬃcient for all (u,d) ∈ Ω,a n dqud is given








with equality if qud > 0. Thus, the bilaterally eﬃcient quantity for (u,d)
depends on the contracts agreed upon by other pairs, that is to say on the
contract structure c. Further, a bilaterally eﬃcient quantity vector is a quan-
tity, one for each pair, such that no pair can increase their aggregate proﬁt
if all other pairs agree upon their bilaterally eﬃcient quantity. A bilater-
ally eﬃcient quantity vector does not necessarily maximize aggregate proﬁts.
Following standard reasoning for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium:
Lemma 1 For any contract structure c and any set of seller-buyer pairs
Ω ⊆ Ω,t h es e to fb i l a t e r a l l ye ﬃcient quantity vectors N (c,Ω) is non-empty.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Third, a price pud yields an equal split of the bilateral surplus if
π
u (c\cud) − π
u (c\(0,0)) = πd (c\cud) − πd (c\(0,0)). (5)
The equal-split price depends on the contracts agreed upon in other negoti-
ations. It is a function of the quantity vector q, but not of other prices.
2.1 Bargaining
A ﬁrm is represented by a separate agent in every negotiation in which it is
involved. The agents, or representatives, are the players in the game, and
they maximize their respective ﬁrm’s proﬁt. It is assumed that they strictly
prefer agreeing at t upon a contract specifying qud =0to agreeing upon
qud =0at t +1or not agreeing at all.
Time is inﬁnite and at every date there is a bargaining stage-game, with
alternating oﬀers. One ﬁrm suggests a contract, i.e. a quantity and a price at
6which the two ﬁrms will trade in all future periods. The other ﬁrm can either
accept or reject the bid. Prior to acceptance there is an implicit contract
specifying qud =0 . Once a bid is accepted, the negotiation is ended. The
agreed contract is binding in all future periods, and there is no renegotiation.
Production occurs at every stage, immediately after the round of negotiations
and according to the (possibly implicit) contract cud (t).
The link structure Ω ⊆ Ω is deﬁned as the set of buyer-seller pairs that
can negotiate. We say that the link structure is complete if Ω = Ω.I f t h e
link structure is incomplete (e.g. due to trade barriers), we simply impose
the restriction that qud (t)=0for all (u,d) ∈ Ω\Ω
At time t the bidder and the respondent both know the history ht that
describes all bids and responses in all negotiations up to t − 1. The respon-
dent also knows the bid to which he must respond. On the other hand the
respondent does not observe any other bids in the same stage game, not even
those given to or by other representatives of his own ﬁrm. For the represen-
tative of upstream ﬁrm u in negotiation (u,d),t h estrategy αud is a function
that speciﬁes for each history ht ab i dbud if u is making the bid, or a response
ρud conditional on the downstream ﬁrm’s bid if d is making the bid. For the
representative of the downstream ﬁrm, αud, bud and ρ
ud are similarly deﬁned.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle α speciﬁes a strategy for all representatives of all ﬁrms.
We only consider pure strategies. As this is a game of imperfect information,
we use sequential rather than subgame perfect equilibrium.4
Proposition 1 For any link structure Ω ⊆ Ω there exists a sequential equi-
librium, implying immediate agreement on quantity vector q if, and only if, q
is bilaterally eﬃcient, i.e. q ∈ N (c,Ω).A sδ → 1, the equilibrium contracts
imply an equal split of bilateral surpluses.
There is thus a close connection between immediate agreement and bilat-
erally eﬃcient quantity vectors. There exists an equilibrium with immediate
agreement for any bilaterally eﬃcient quantity vector, but not for any other
quantity vector. The existence of such bilaterally eﬃcient equilibria is due
to complete information, price/quantity contracting, and no trade before
agreement.5
4Essentially, “consistency of beliefs” implies that after receiving an out-of-equilibrium
bid, a respondent should expect other bidders to have followed their equilibrium strate-
gies (cf. Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1990). McAfee and Schwartz (1994) label the same
restriction “passive beliefs.”
5Under two-sided asymmetric information, there may be delay and ex post ineﬃcient
agreements (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). Writing contracts for both price and
quantity is crucial for bilateral eﬃciency (McDonald and Solow, 1981). When there is
trade before agreement, delay can occur in equilibrium (Haller and Holden, 1990).
7To prove this proposition, Lemma 2 (in the Appendix) considers a sub-
game in which there is one ongoing negotiation only. It is shown that ﬁrms
agree immediately on the bilaterally eﬃcient quantity and that (as δ → 1)
they split the bilateral surplus equally. This is a simple application of stan-
dard Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining. Lemma 3 considers a subgame with many
ongoing negotiations. First, it shows that there exists an equilibrium with
immediate agreement on q ∈ N (c,Ω) and with an equal split of the bilateral
surpluses. A deviation from the prescribed equilibrium in a single negotia-
tion (u,d) will not aﬀect the other negotiations, since it is not observed until
the following period. Hence, for all other negotiations (i,j) 6=( u,d),t h e r ei s
immediate agreement on the prescribed contracts. From the point of view of
(u,d), all other negotiations can thus be treated as concluded, and Lemma
2 applies for negotiation (u,d). Second, if q/ ∈ N (c,Ω) is prescribed, there
exists at least one pair (u,d) that will improve bilateral eﬃciency by way of
a unilateral deviation according to Lemma 2.
Immediate agreements can be ensured by imposing a Markov restriction.
In the formal deﬁnition of the Markov restriction we interpret an equilibrium
as a proﬁle of beliefs. Let ck
ij be player k’s belief about the “outcome” of a
negotiation (i,j). For convenience we restrict the “outcome” to the (possibly







is k’s belief about the contract structure that will be
implemented in the current period.
Deﬁnition 1 Beliefs ck are Markov if:
1. Belief ck is a function of (c,Ω) only, and
2. Consider two states (c,Ω) and (e c, e Ω) and assume that e Ω = Ω\{(i,j)}
and e c = c\e cij.I fck
ij (c,Ω)=e cij,t h e nck (c,Ω)=ck(e c, e Ω).
A Markov strategy is a strategy which is optimal, given Markov beliefs.
The ﬁrst point requires that beliefs are the same for payoﬀ-equivalent histo-
ries, along the lines suggested by Maskin and Tirole (2000). In this model any
two histories giving rise to the same (c,Ω) are payoﬀ-equivalent. Rejected
bids and the dates of previous agreements do not aﬀect the continuation pay-
oﬀs in ongoing negotiations. Markov strategies are thus functions of (c,Ω)
only.6
6Two histories giving rise to (c,Ω) and (c0,Ω) may in fact be payoﬀ equivalent. As such
equivalence is irrelevant to our purposes, we ignore it for the sake of notational simplicity.
8Point two strengthens the Markov assumption. Given history e ht all play-
ers know that (i,j) have agreed on cij at some time s<t , and hence will
implement cij in period t and all future periods. Given history ht all players
believe (with probability one) that (i,j) will agree on cij at t, and hence will
implement cij in period t and all future periods. From the point of view of
all players, except the representatives in negotiation (i,j),t h et w oh i s t o r i e s
are payoﬀ equivalent.7 Consequently, we require that these players do not
condition their behavior at t on whether they know or believe that cij will be
implemented from t onwards. The only reason why one player might want
to make a distinction between the two histories is if some other player makes
that distinction. That is, although it is payoﬀ-irrelevant, the distinction may
be used as a signal (a sun spot) to coordinate the remaining players’ behavior
on diﬀerent equilibria in the diﬀerent subgames. Although the second point
constitutes an addition to the traditional Markov restriction, the spirit is the
same. The restriction reduces the information on which ﬁrms can condition
their behavior (since the behavior must be the same for certain histories).
Moreover, the restriction does not violate the rationality of the ﬁrms. That
is, it is optimal for a ﬁrm to use a Markov strategy, if all the other ﬁrms are
using them.
Proposition 2 All equilibria prescribe immediate agreement if the players
use Markov strategies, or if production is strictly convex.
T op r o v et h a tM a r k o vi ss u ﬃcient, Lemma 4 is concerned with subgames
Γ(hT) in which equilibrium α induces delay, i.e. where play according to α
implies that all negotiations do not end at t. It is shown that some subgame
Γ(hS) of Γ(hT) must exist in which α induces delay with strictly fewer ongo-
ing negotiations. In any subgame Γ(hT), ﬁrms have an incentive to conclude
their negotiations immediately. Suppose that u proposes an agreement in
(u,d) one period earlier than prescribed by α. If there is delay conditional
on agreement, the lemma is proved. If not, there must be delay in a subset
of negotiations in the subgame after d has rejected the deviating bid. If all
ongoing negotiations are concluded at the same time, they will conform to
bilateral eﬃciency and equal splitting, in the case of either acceptance or
rejection. Both u and d will then gain by the deviation, contradicting the as-
sumption that α was an equilibrium. The proposition is shown by repeatedly
applying Lemma 4, implying each time that there exist subgames with delay
7All players in the ongoing negotiations have the same strategy sets, and their contin-
uation payoﬀs are identical in the two subgames.
9with fewer ongoing negotiations. Since the number of initial negotiations is
ﬁnite, we obtain a contradiction.8
Without Markov and strict convexity, there may be delay in equilibrium.
To see this, recall that immediate agreement on any bilaterally eﬃcient quan-
tity vector is still an equilibrium, without the Markov restriction. Consider
for example the case of homogenous goods, which violates strict convexity.
Diﬀerent equilibria (bilaterally eﬃcient quantity vectors) do then exist, cor-
responding to diﬀerent distributions of sales (who sells to whom). Moreover,
ﬁrms receive diﬀerent payoﬀsi nt h ed i ﬀerent equilibria. It can be shown
that if downstream ﬁrms have steeper marginal cost curves than upstream
ﬁrms, then the downstream (upstream) ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher, the more
proportional (exclusive) the sales are (see Propositions 5 below). Given this
multiplicity we can construct a non-Markov equilibrium entailing delay. Ac-
cording to this equilibrium, all ﬁrms are to conclude negotiations in round
2, making “unreasonable” bids in period 1. Deviations are punished by se-
lecting an appropriate equilibrium in period 2. If an upstream ﬁrm makes a
“reasonable” bid in period 1, the equilibrium play contingent on rejection is
to agree upon proportional sales, thereby punishing the deviating upstream
ﬁrm and awarding the rejecting downstream ﬁrm.
The equilibrium contract structure can also be derived using a more co-
operative approach. Deﬁne the bilateral Nash product as
[π
u (c\cud) − π
u (c\(0,0))][πd (c\cud) − πd (c\(0,0))]. (6)
The disagreement point in the negotiation between u and d is identiﬁed with
the so-called impasse point, that is to say the payoﬀ obtained by u and d
if both ﬁrms reject any oﬀer in the (u,d) bargaining, all other contracts
being taken as given. It is easy to see that cud =( qud,p ud) maximizes the
bilateral Nash product if, and only if, qud is bilaterally eﬃcient, and pud
yields an equal split of the bilateral surplus. The propositions thus provide
a non-cooperative foundation for the “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining”
approach discussed in the Introduction.
8The proof that strict convexity is suﬃcient is similar and has therefore been omitted.
The crucial point is that the bilaterally eﬃcient quantity vector is unique.
103 Quantities and Eﬃciency
Disregarding the distribution of proﬁts between ﬁrms, we deﬁne social welfare

















Note that prices aﬀect the distribution of wealth but not social welfare and
are consequently not included as an argument in the welfare function. Con-
sumers can be disregarded since the price of ﬁnal goods is constant.
Proposition 3 Production is socially eﬃcient, subject to the zero-quantity
constraints imposed by any missing links.
The equilibrium is thus socially eﬃcient regardless of concentration.9
To understand the result, note that in all negotiations the chosen quantity
equalizes the seller’s marginal cost to the buyer’s marginal valuation. Why
this bilateral eﬃciency also implies social eﬃciency is most easily understood
in the case of homogeneous goods. By equalizing its marginal valuation to
the marginal costs in all negotiations, a buyer guarantees that all its partners
have the same marginal cost. Similarly, every seller guarantees that all its
partners have the same marginal valuations of the good. If the link structure
is suﬃciently complete, all sellers produce at the same marginal cost and all
buyers have the same marginal valuation. The absence of coordination failure
should also be noted. If the welfare function were to have several local max-
ima, the bilateral oligopoly might get stuck at a maximum that is not global.
When all cost functions are convex, however, the welfare function is concave,
and there is a unique maximum. Another reason for eﬃciency is the timing.
If some contracts were negotiated before others (e.g. machinery before oil),
there would be strategic commitment with resulting ineﬃciencies.10
9The eﬃciency result may be interpreted as including eﬃcient transportations. Assume
that goods are delivered free on board, and that the downstream ﬁrms’ cost functions
include all transportation costs. Then, not only the allocation of production between
ﬁr m si se ﬃcient. The equilibrium trading pattern, i.e. who sells to whom, minimizes the
transportation costs.
10Consider the case of one upstream ﬁrm u, and two downstream ﬁrms d and b.A s s u m e
that Cu =( qd + qb)
2 /2, Cd = kqd and Cb =0 . If agreements are made simultaneously, u
will only sell to the eﬃcient ﬁrm b.I fu can start negotiations with d one period earlier,
they will trade a positive quantity (qd = r/2 − k), thereby increasing the price that b has
to pay.
11Proposition 3 shows that a complete link structure is suﬃcient for a bi-
lateral oligopoly to be eﬃcient. However, real-world link structures are in-
complete for various reasons,11 and it can thus be interesting to see whether
equilibria also may be eﬃcient with incomplete link structures. To do this, let
us deﬁne the number of active links associated with an (equilibrium) quantity
vector as the number of buyer-seller pairs trading strictly positive quantities.
Proposition 4 Consider a homogeneous goods market. There exists a so-
cially eﬃcient equilibrium with U + D − 1 active links. Generically, this is
the minimum number of active links of an eﬃcient equilibrium.
Intuitively, for a homogeneous goods market to be eﬃcient, all upstream
ﬁr m sm u s th a v et h es a m em a r g i n a lc o s t( U−1 conditions) and all downstream
ﬁrms must have the same marginal cost (D−1 conditions). A ﬁnal condition
arises from the requirement that supply must equal demand. To satisfy the
U+D−1 conditions, the same number of instruments (i.e. quantities qud) will
typically be needed. Proving the Proposition is more complicated, however.
To take the non-negativity constraints (qud ≥ 0) into account, we construct
an algorithm generating an eﬃcient link structure with only U +D−1 links
for any market. Let us start with a link between two ﬁrms. Generically,
either the buyer or the seller will not be able to satisfy its demand or its
supply. In the ﬁrst (second) case, add a link between the buyer (seller) and
an additional seller (buyer). Generically, either the last seller or the last
buyer will not be satisﬁed. The procedure is then repeated, stopping after
U + D − 1 steps.
The U + D − 1 links cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The link structure
must be connected. Assume that there is no cross-border trade between
two regional markets, A and B. Production is socially eﬃc i e n ti ne a c hr e -
gional market, due for example to regionally complete link structures. Let
pA and pB be the two hypothetical Walrasian prices. Production is globally
eﬃcient if, and only if, pA = pB, a condition which is not satisﬁed generi-
cally. The intuition for the condition is simple. If country A has relatively
little upstream capacity (thus pA >p B), the upstream (downstream) ﬁrms
in country A produce at a higher (lower) marginal cost than the ﬁrms in
country B. Production is thus not allocated optimally. The upstream and
downstream production capacities are examples of (sector) speciﬁc( p r o d u c -
tion) factors. Diﬀerences in the relative endowments of the speciﬁcf a c t o r s
11The link structure may be incomplete for political reasons, e.g. trade barriers. In-
completeness may also arise (endogenously) because it is costly to establish links. Finally,
there may be strategic motives for ﬁrms not to negotiate with each other, e.g. foreclosure.
12thus give rise to gains from trade, and trade liberalization enhances global
welfare. (Another reason why pA and pB may diﬀer is that the two countries
have diﬀerent production technologies.) This result is related to the theory of
comparative advantage, and in particular to the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem.
However, we derive our results in a rather diﬀerent environment, where all
ﬁr m sh a v em a r k e tp o w e r ,a n dw h e r et h el a wo fo n ep r i c ed o e sn o th o l d .
4 Prices and Distribution
To study the distribution of surplus, we solve for the equilibrium price:
pud = r/2 −
Cd (q) − Cd (q\qud =0 )
qud
/2+
Cu (q) − Cu (q\qud =0 )
qud
/2, (8)
where the two parentheses contain the average incremental costs of producing
qud, and where all quantities are at their equilibrium levels. As a benchmark
we use the Walrasian price which is deﬁned as the market clearing price,
assuming that both upstream and downstream ﬁrms are price-takers. The
Walrasian price is denoted by p∗










where q is the socially eﬃcient quantity vector. In the case of homogenous
g o o d s ,t h eu n i q u eW a l r a s i a np r i c ei sd e n o t e dp∗.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which goods are homogenous and all upstream
(downstream) ﬁrms have access to the same technology. The short-run cost
function for ﬁrm u is given by C (Qu,k u),w h e r eku is u’s capital level, and the
equivalent applies for downstream ﬁrms. The incremental costs are given by
C (Qd,k d) − C (Qd − qud,k d) and C (Qu,ku) − C (Qu − qud,k u) respectively,
suggesting that the prices are determined by the distribution of capital and
the distribution of sales. To show this formally, we conduct three experi-
ments. As it turns out, the result hinges on the relative shape of downstream




u) >C qq (Qd − x,Kd) for all x ≤ min{Q
u,Q d}.( 1 0 )
12The ﬁrst order condition for a price taking upstream ﬁrm is pud−∂Cu (q)/∂qud =0and
the ﬁrst order condition for a price taking downstream ﬁrm is r−pud−∂Cd (q)/∂qud =0 .
To derive equation (9), subtract one from the other.
13Proposition 5 In an eﬃcient homogeneous goods market, trade may occur
at diﬀerent prices. In particular:
1. A seller with more capital charges a higher (lower) price to the same
buyer for the same quantity than a seller with less capital, if Cqk(Qu,k)/Cqq (Qu,k)
is falling (increasing) in Qu.
2. A seller distributing q units evenly between two buyers of the same size
earns a higher revenue than when selling diﬀe r e n ta m o u n t s ,i fi th a sa
steeper marginal cost curve than the downstream ﬁrms.
3. Assume that there are constant returns to scale both upstream and
downstream, with average variable costs a and a respectively. Indi-









The ﬁrst two points show that the law of one price does not hold, and that
prices are not completely determined by aggregate supply and demand.
The ﬁr s tp o i n ts h o w st h a tt h edistribution of capital between ﬁrms does
matter. To demonstrate this we compare the prices charged by two upstream
ﬁrms which have diﬀerent amounts of capital and are selling the same quan-
tity to a particular downstream ﬁrm. Under reasonable conditions (e.g. if
there are constant returns to scale, or if marginal costs are linear), big buyers
(sellers) get better deals than small buyers (sellers) at any given quantity.
Since the comparison is made at given quantities, this prediction is diﬀerent
from quantity discounts. This result is surprising at ﬁrst sight. It shows that
ﬁrms with low marginal costs (i.e. high capital) may charge higher prices
than high-cost ﬁrms for selling the same amount of goods to the same cus-
tomer. The explanation is that the incremental cost may be higher for the
low-cost ﬁrm in equilibrium. Although the low-cost ﬁrm has a lower cost at
each output level, it produces more in equilibrium and therefore has a higher
cost at the (discrete) margin.
The second point shows that the distribution of sales (who sells to whom)
does matter. In the case of homogeneous goods, there are multiple equilibria
with diﬀerent sales distributions. Even though all equilibria are eﬃcient,
prices vary with the equilibrium chosen. To make this point, we compare the
prices charged by two upstream ﬁrms with diﬀerent trading patterns, but
the same amount of capital. Consider the case in which upstream ﬁrms have
increasing marginal costs but downstream ﬁrms have constant marginal costs.
An upstream ﬁrm distributing its sales equally among many downstream
ﬁrms will have a high incremental cost in all negotiations, and will therefore
charge a high price.
14In the third experiment we manipulate both the distribution of capital
and the distribution of sales to show that not only individual prices but also
the average price, may diﬀer from the Walrasian price.
Social eﬃciency in combination with relation-speciﬁc prices can be under-
stood in the light of perfect price discrimination. In contrast to the standard
model, however, we allow for competing buyers and sellers and show that
eﬃciency is independent of the number of ﬁrms. Moreover, not only the
sellers but also the buyers have bargaining power, and both capture a share
of the social surplus. The result, namely that price discrimination leads to
eﬃciency, suggests that policies condemning price discrimination should be
implemented with caution in markets with bilateral market power.
There is a close connection between the negotiated prices, pud,a n dt h e
Walrasian prices, p∗
ud. A comparison of equations (8) and (9) shows that the
only diﬀerence is that pud is determined by the average incremental costs of
producing qud, while p∗
ud is determined by the marginal costs of production.
For small qud the average incremental costs and the marginal costs are ap-
proximately the same. Given an eﬃcient equilibrium in which qud is close to
zero, pud is close to the Walrasian price.





d=1. Let a sequence of economies for s =1 ,2,... consist




d=1,w h e r eUs+1 >U s and Ds+1 >D s. Let
{p∗
ud (s)} be the associated sequence of Walrasian prices, and {(q(s),p(s))}
an associated sequence of equilibrium contract structures.
Proposition 6 Consider a sequence of economies, and an associated se-
quence of socially eﬃcient contract structures. If qud (s) → 0 for all u and d,
maxu,d |pud (s) − p∗
ud (s)| → 0.
Note that qud (s) → 0 is crucial for Walrasian prices. In particular, con-
sider an economy with Us = Ds = s, where all upstream ﬁrms are identical
and all downstream ﬁrms are identical, and assume that upstream ﬁrm u ≤ s
sells exclusively to downstream ﬁrm d = u in each economy (which is a so-
cially eﬃcient equilibrium). For every s in the sequence the economy then
consists of s bilateral monopolies all trading at the bilateral monopoly price,
which typically is diﬀerent from the Walrasian price. Although each ﬁrm
buys or sells only a small share of the total market quantity, namely 1/s,t h e
prices diﬀer from the Walrasian price.
Propositions 3 (eﬃcient quantities) and 6 (Walrasian prices) provide a
foundation for Walrasian equilibrium on two grounds. First, in our model
the agents set prices themselves without the help of an auctioneer. Second,
Proposition 6 is a limit theorem and not a theorem in the limit. That is,
15the Walrasian price is an approximation of a large but ﬁnite economy. Eﬃ-
ciency is attained even when there are only a few ﬁrms. This result is thus
much stronger than the limit results reported in the previous literature (Gale,
2000).13
The “small-size requirement” for Walrasian prices is more demanding
than has previously been understood, however. It is often said that if ev-
ery ﬁrm in the industry makes a triﬂing fraction of the industry’s sales or
purchases, a single price will rule in a market (see e.g. Stigler, 1968). In
our model it is not suﬃcient that each ﬁrm’s sales or purchases are small in
relation to the aggregate market quantity. Every ﬁrm must only account for
a small share of every partner’s trading volume.
5 Imperfect Competition in the Final Goods
Market
Assume that downstream ﬁrms compete à la Cournot in the downstream
market. The ﬁrst order condition for bilateral eﬃciency is then given by














The second term is present because the ﬁrms aﬀect prices in the ﬁnal goods
market. We do not establish conditions for the existence of a bilaterally eﬃ-
cient quantity vector, but simply presume its existence. It is possible, how-
ever, to verify the existence of a unique bilaterally eﬃcient quantity vector
in simple examples. It is also possible to show that a sequential equilibrium
exists implying immediate agreement on q if, and only if, q is bilaterally ef-
ﬁcient. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, and has therefore
been omitted here.
Our main result shows that a bilateral oligopoly is eﬃcient also when
there is market power in the ﬁnal goods market. As a benchmark we use the
Walrasian equilibrium, which presumes that all upstream and downstream
ﬁr m st a k et h ep r i c e so fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s( b u tn o tﬁnal goods) as given.14
13Thus, our results contribute to the strategic foundations of general equilibrium (or
the theory of decentralized trade). The previous literature, reviewed by Osborne and
Rubinstein (1990) and Gale (2000), consider random matching of buyers and sellers (en-
dowed with one unit of the indivisable good), each match being an ultimatum game. See
Westermark (2000) for an application to labor markets.
14We use the Walrasian equilibirum as a benchmark rather than a social planner, since
16Proposition 7 If a bilaterally eﬃcient equilibrium exists, it is as eﬃcient
as a Walrasian equilibrium.
That is, market power in the intermediate goods market does not necessarily
give rise to ineﬃciencies over and above those resulting from market power
in the ﬁn a lg o o d sm a r k e t .T h ee ﬃciency of the intermediate goods market
is due in part to the absence of so-called double marginalization, which in
turn may be explained by the fact that ﬁrms contract for both prices and
quantities.15




















rid (q\qud) − rid (q\0)
qud
qid. (12)
The last term indicates that the relative bargaining power of u and d is
determined by the substitutability between the diﬀerent goods sold by d,
i.e. the diﬀerentiation between upstream ﬁrms.16 In particular, the more
substitutable qud and qvb,t h el o w e ri spud (given q and r). When consumers
see the products of the upstream ﬁrms as close substitutes, a downstream
ﬁrm will not suﬀe rm u c hb yn o tc o m i n gt oa na g r e e m e n tw i t hap a r t i c u l a r
upstream ﬁrm. Not selling u’s product increases the demand and the price
for the other products sold by d. In this case, downstream ﬁrms have a
strong bargaining position. The last term of equation (12) has implications
for the preferences of ﬁrms among diﬀerent trading patterns. Assume that
all ﬁrms have constant marginal costs, then downstream ﬁrms will prefer to
buy intermediate goods from several upstream ﬁrms, while upstream ﬁrms
prefer exclusive dealing.17
it is not possible to let a social planner choose quantities in the intermediate goods market,
without at the same time correcting for the Cournot ineﬃciency.
15One may ask why an upstream monopoly cannot induce a monopoly in the downstream
sector by selling the monopoly quantity to one downstream ﬁrm, for example d,a n d
n o t h i n gt oa n yo t h e rﬁrm, for example b. The reason is that u has an incentive to cheat on
d by agreeing upon the bilaterally eﬃcient quantity qub with b. However, if we would make
the link structure endogenous, it may be proﬁtable for u to form one link only, thereby
committing itself not to cheat.
16Note that for qud small, [rid (q\qud) − rid (q\0)]/qud is approximately equal to the
cross derivative of demand.
17In the present model it is only the degree of substitutability between the upstream
ﬁrms’ products that is important for bargaining power in the intermediate goods market.
176 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper has been to construct a model that captures four
key institutional characteristics of many intermediate goods markets, and to
address some basic microeconomic issues concerning the eﬃciency and dis-
tribution of surplus in such markets. In doing so, we have derived some more
precise predictions amenable to empirical testing. The ﬁnding that bilateral
oligopolies are socially eﬃcient can be tested, even in the absence of marginal
cost data. Aggregate production should vary with the total amount of cap-
ital, but not as a result of mergers and spin-oﬀs. The ﬁndings that large
ﬁrms get better deals than small ﬁrms, and that a seller with an even dis-
tribution of sales obtains higher prices than a seller with a more exclusive
sales (under certain conditions) are testable, but do require data on contract
prices. Again, a more indirect test is feasible. It is easy to show that horizon-
tal mergers increase the proﬁts of the merging ﬁrms and reduce the proﬁts
of their trading partners. This may in fact explain an earlier empirical re-
sult that seller proﬁtability is negatively related to buyer concentration (see
Lustgarten, 1975; Schumacher, 1991; and for a review see Scherer and Ross,
1990). Previously, this regularity has been understood in light of the theory
of collusion described in Stigler (1964), (sellers are more likely to collude if
there are many customers). Our results show that the empirical regularity
is consistent with non-collusion between ﬁrms. Furthermore, under addi-
tional assumptions (linear marginal costs), the average price is determined
by the diﬀerence in concentration (Hirﬁndahl index) between upstream and
downstream ﬁrms. This prediction may be used as a basis for new and more
structurally oriented empirical studies of bilateral oligopolies.
The most important step for further theoretical research is to endogenize
the link structure. The link structure has been shown to be a key deter-
minant of social eﬃciency in bilateral oligopolies, as well as an important
determinant of the distribution of surplus. Endogenizing the links is likely
to be non-trivial, due to the strategic externalities that are likely to exist
between diﬀerent links. The studying of links is also policy-relevant. Trade
policies such as tariﬀsa n dq u o t a sa ﬀect the link structure. Antitrust action
against vertical foreclosure may contribute to a more complete link struc-
ture. Investments in infrastructure reduce the cost for distant ﬁrms forming
links with each other. The importance of such policies can only be studied
in a model with endogenous links. Other important applications involve the
In reality, however, high substitutability between diﬀerent downstream ﬁrms (e.g. retailers
that are located close to each other) may give upstream ﬁrms high bargaining power (cf.
Porter, 1976).
18eﬀects of the Internet, which has presumably reduced the cost of links.
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20Proofs
Preliminaries
At date t one ﬁrm makes a bid bud (t) which is a pair (qud (t),p ud (t)) ∈ R2
+
where qud (t) is a quantity and pud (t) is the price. The other ﬁrm is allowed
either to accept or reject the bid, ρud (t) ∈ {y,n}.T h eaction at time t,i s
the UD-tuple (a11 (t),...,a ud (t)),w h e r eaud (t)=( bud (t),ρ ud (t)).Ahistory
at time t,d e n o t e dht,i sat-tuple of actions (a0,...,at−1),w i t hh0 denoting
the “empty” history at t =0 .L e tHt be the set of possible ht.L e tcud (ht)=
bud (T) if rud (T)=y for some T<t .L e tΓ(hT) denote the subgame induced
by the history hT at time T. The representative of ﬁrm u in negotiation
(u,d) has the following strategy:
bud (ht):Ht → R
2
+,a n d
ρud (ht,b):Ht × R
2
+ → {y,n},
and similarly for upstream ﬁrms’ representatives.
Let ht (hT,α) with t ≥ 0 be the history such that (i) for t ≤ T it is on
the path to hT,a n d( i i )f o rt>Tit is induced by α contingent on hT having
been reached.
Let Ω(hT) ⊆ Ω denote the set of ongoing negotiations (u,d) at the be-
ginning of subgame Γ(hT).
Lemma 1
Let Bud (q) denote the set of bilaterally eﬃcient quantities for (u,d), and let
B (q) be the cartesian product of all Bud. As the bilateral surplus for (u,d) is
a continuous and concave function of q, B (q) by the theorem of the maximum
is a convex-valued, upper-hemi continuous correspondence. By the Kakutani
ﬁxed point theorem, there exists a ﬁxed point.
Proposition 1
Consider a subset of negotiations Ω ⊆ Ω and a ﬁxed contract structure c,
with the associated vector of quantities q.L e tb q(c,Ω) be a selection in N,
which is non-empty by Lemma 1, i.e. b q(c,Ω) ∈ N (c,Ω).D e ﬁne the price
ˆ pud (b q,t) by
ˆ pud (b q,t)=
½
e pud (b q)+εud (b q,δ) if u is bidding at t
e pud (b q) − εud (b q,δ) if d is bidding at t (13)
21where
e pud (b q)=1
2


















Cd (b q) − Cd (b q\qud =0 )
b qud
− r +





Let Ω(hT) ⊆ Ω denote the set of ongoing negotiations (u,d) at the be-
ginning of subgame Γ(hT). The next lemma considers the case when only
one negotiation remains.
Lemma 2 Assume Ω(hT)={(u,d)} and c(hT)=c with cud =( 0 ,0).I f
b qud (c,{(u,d)}) 6=0there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
subgame Γ(hT), implying immediate agreement. According to this equilib-
rium, bud (ht)=( pud (b q(c,{(u,d)})), b q(c,{(u,d)})) and bud (ht)=
³
p
ud (b q(c,{(u,d)})), b q(c,{(u,d
Moreover, ﬁr m sa c c e p t( r e j e c t )a n yo ﬀer giving them a higher (lower) proﬁt
than implied by the equilibrium bids.
Proof: The existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium follows from
Binmore (1987). The equilibrium prescribes immediate agreement on a Pareto-
eﬃcient outcome in every subgame. In the present context, this is equivalent
to quantities being bilaterally eﬃcient. According to standard Rubinstein-























Using the fact that both ﬁrms propose the bilaterally eﬃcient quantity, that
is qud = q




do not depend on time or history.
Lemma 3 There exists a sequential equilibrium with all (u,d) ∈ Ω(hT)
agreeing immediately on cud =( qud,p ud) at T if, and only if, qud =ˆ qud with
b q ∈ N (c(hT),Ω(hT)). In addition, pud =ˆ pud (b q,T) for all (u,d) ∈ Ω(hT)
where ˆ qud 6=0 .
Proof: Consider (u,d) ∈ Ω(hT). Deviations from prescribed equilibrium at
T by u or d will not aﬀect hT by the informational assumptions. Hence, for
22all other negotiations (i,j) 6=( u,d) there is immediate agreement on contract
cij (hT). Lemma 2 thus applies for negotiation (u,d).
Assume immediate agreement on q/ ∈ N (c,Ω). There then exists at
least one pair (u,d) ∈ Ω that will improve bilateral eﬃciency by a unilateral
deviation according to Lemma 2. Likewise, any pud 6= b pud (q,T) is either not
maximizing the bidders proﬁts or will be rejected.
Proposition 2
We say that strategy proﬁle α induces delay in Γ(hT) if Ω(hT+1 (hT,α)) 6= ∅.
Lemma 4 Consider an equilibrium α a n das u b g a m eΓ(hT).I f α induces
delay at T, then there exists a subgame Γ(hS) of Γ(hT) (with S>T )s u c h
that α induces delay in Γ(hS) and ∅ 6= Ω(hS) ⊂ Ω(hT).
Proof: Assume that there exists some date t>Tsuch that some, but not all,
negotiations in Ω(hT) are concluded. The Lemma then follows immediately,
since there is delay in subgame Γ(ht). Two cases remain to be considered.
Case 1: Assume that α prescribes that everybody agrees at t>T .A
deviation specifying the same ˆ qud at t − 1 will increase payoﬀ for (u,d),
as by the Markov assumption conditional on disagreement, the actions of
everybody else will be the same. Thus α cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2: Assume that nobody ever agrees in subgame Γ(hT).C o n s i d e r
negotiation (u,d) ∈ Ω(hS−1 (hT,α)) in some period S − 1 ≥ T.L e t hS be
the history in which u suggests qud =0in period S − 1,a n dd accepts (all
others play according to α). Let h
−
S be the history in which d rejects. In both
subgames, three outcomes are logically possible: immediate agreement, no
agreement, or agreement at diﬀerent times. In the case of the last possibility,
the Lemma is immediately proved.






. T h e ni tc a n n o tb e
t h ec a s et h a tα prescribes immediate agreement or no agreement in Γ(hS).
Thus α induces delay in Γ(hS) with fewer active negotiations. Immediate
agreement or no agreement in Γ(hS) would imply that d’s acceptance of the
bid qud =0is equilibrium play. If d accepts and all negotiations end at
S, Lemma 3 implies that the agreement is on b q ∈ N (c(hS),Ω(hS)) and
the corresponding prices b p. An agreement on bilaterally eﬃcient quantity
vector b q cannot reduce the proﬁts of u and d relative to the proﬁts under
no agreement at all, according to Assumption 1. Finally, d accepting the
bid implies that it is better for u to suggest qud =0in period S − 1 than
equilibrium play (no agreements).







arguments then show that α cannot prescribe immediate agreement or no
agreement in Γ(hS).
P r o o fo ft h eP r o p o s i t i o n Assume on the contrary that α is an equilib-
rium strategy proﬁle that induces delay in Γ(hT).A c c o r d i n g t o L e m m a 4 ,
there exists a subgame with delay with fewer negotiations. Repeated appli-





⊂ Ω(hTk) and Ω(hTk) 6= ∅ for all Tk.A sΩ(hT) is a ﬁnite
set, we obtain a contradiction.
Proposition 3
The welfare function is maximized when the sum (across ﬁrms) of per-
period proﬁts is maximized. Moreover, ∂W/∂qud = ∂πd/∂qud + ∂πu/∂qud
as ∂πu/∂qij =0for i 6= u and ∂πd/∂qij =0for j 6= d. If production is con-
vex (strictly convex), it can be shown that the welfare function W is concave
(strictly concave).
T h ec h o i c es e ti sc o n v e xs i n c ei ti sd e ﬁned by non-negativity (qud ≥ 0)a n d
equality (qud =0for (u,d) ∈ Ω\Ω) constraints. The choice set is bounded
in the case of strictly convex production. By the maximum theorem we see
that as the welfare function W is concave, there exists a non-empty compact
convex set of quantities in R
U×D
+ maximizing W.
According to Proposition 1 all equilibria are bilaterally eﬃcient. The set
of ﬁrst order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for bilateral eﬃciency is the same as
the set of ﬁrst order conditions for social welfare.
Proposition 4
Genericity is taken to mean that if α 6= U or β 6= D,t h e n
Pα
u=1 Qu 6= Pβ
d=1 Qd. Maximizing social welfare, we get: r − C0
d (Qd) − C0
u (Qu)=0 .
Similarly r − C0
d (Qd) − C0

















As both Cd and Cu are assumed to be monotonic, we have a unique set of
Qu and Qd satisfying the equations.
24As we have U +D −1 independent equations, we cannot generically add
more than UD− U − D +1independent equations such as qij =0without
getting an over-speciﬁed system of equations. Thus the number of active
links cannot generically be less than U + D − 1. The set of quantity vectors













where Qu = Su (p∗) and Qd = Dd (r − p∗).
To prove the proposition, we construct an eﬃcient quantity vector b q with
U + D − 1 active links using the following algorithm.
1. Initial step: Set all b qud =0 .S e ta l lb Qu =0and b Qd =0 .S e tα =1and
β =1 .
2. Determine b qαβ, by requiring ﬁrm α to deliver the maximum possible
quantity to ﬁrm β.L e tb qαβ =m i n
n
Qα − b Qα,Q β − b Qβ
o
.18
3. Increase α or β by one. (a) Set b Qα = b Qα + b qαβ and b Qβ = b Qβ + b qαβ.
(b) If b Qα = Qα, set α = α +1 ;( c )I fb Qβ = Qβ,s e tβ = β +1 .
4. If β>Dor α>Ustop. Otherwise, go to step 2.
Note that the algorithm ends after a ﬁnite number of iterations. Steps 2a
and 3a imply that b Qβ = Qβ or b Qα = Qα. Hence, α or β is increased by one
in each iteration (3b-c). The algorithm stops if β>Dor α>U(step 4).
Next, we show that the generated b q satisﬁes
P
u b qud = Qd and
P
d b qud =
Qu for all u and d. The algorithm stops if and only if α = U +1or β = D+1
(step 4). If both equalities hold, then from 3b-c we see that
P
u b qud = Qd
and
P
d b qud = Qu for all d ≤ D and u ≤ U. Now we will show that when the
algorithm stops, α = U +1and β = D+1. Assume on the contrary that the












18Note that: b qαβ > 0,s i n c eQβ − b Qβ > 0 and Qα − b Qα > 0.
25T h es e c o n de q u a l i t yf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h es u mo fd e l i v e r e dg o o d si s















Note that Qα − b Qα > 0 due to α ≤ U.( T h eﬁn a lt i m es t e p3 bi se x e c u t e d ,
then either Qα > b Qα or Qα = b Qα. In the latter case α is increased by one,






















d=1 Qd). Similarly, we can not have
β ≤ D.
Finally, we show that the number of active links will be U +D−1.N o t e
that only one of α and β is increased by one (in step 3 of every iteration)





















d=1 Qd. Next, note that the
algorithm ends after U +D −1 iterations. The ﬁrst time step 2 is executed,
α + β =2 . The last time step 2 is executed, α + β = U + D.A s e x a c t l y
one quantity b qud is made strictly positive each time step 2 is performed, the
number of active links will be U + D − 1.
Proposition 5
Point 1: We want to compare the prices that two diﬀerent upstream ﬁrms
h and l charge to the same buyer d, assuming that qhd = qld ≡ qd.


























That is, the diﬀerence in price is determined by the diﬀerence in incremental
cost that the two ﬁrms have for supplying qd.






= Qh. To see this






































































































































































Since Cqq is positive, the sign of the right-hand side is determined by the





+ x<Q (z) since
x ∈
£
Ql − qd,Q l¤
. Hence, ∆ > 0 if Cqk (Q,k)/Cqq (Q,k) is falling in Q.
27Point 2: I nt h er e s to ft h ep r o o fw eo m i tt h ec a p i t a ll e v e la sa na r g u m e n t
in the cost function. Consider an upstream ﬁrm u in its dealings with two
downstream ﬁrms 1 and 2.W ew a n tt oﬁnd the most proﬁtable distribution
of sales (qu1,q u2) given that qu1 + qu2 = x. Reallocations of sales between































































− x + qu1
¶
,





























− x + qu1
¶¸
.
Hence, if the downstream (upstream) ﬁrms’ marginal costs are steeper in the
range of x units, then the revenue function is strictly convex (concave). In
these cases there exists a unique interior extremum. It is simple to verify






















Hence, if the downstream (upstream) ﬁrms’ marginal costs are steeper in the
range of x units, then the revenue function is strictly increasing (decreasing)
at qu1 =0and strictly decreasing (increasing) at qu1 =0 .
Thus, if the downstream (upstream) ﬁrms’ marginal costs are steeper in
the range of x units, then the revenue function has two minima (maxima) at
the endpoints and a maximum (minimum) at the symmetric allocation.
Point 3: First, note that if the technology has (long-run) constant
returns to scale, ﬁrm u’s short run cost function can be written kuC (Qu/ku).
(This follows from the fact that the short-run cost function is homogeneous
of degree one in Qu and ku.) Second, in equilibrium, ﬁrm u produces Qu = ¡
ku/K
¢
Q.S i n c e Q is eﬃcient, it does not depend on the distribution of
28capital or the distribution of sales. Third, in equilibrium all upstream ﬁrms
produce at the same average variable cost













Q, and the equivalent applies for downstream ﬁrms.





















































Note that pud is monotonically decreasing in qud/Qu and monotonically in-
creasing in qud/Qd. T h i sf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h em a r g i n a lc o s t sa r e
increasing, implying that average incremental costs are higher at higher out-
put levels.
Thus, to ﬁnd an upper bound on pud assume that qud/Qd =1and that





















= p∗, pud =( p∗ + r − a)/2. The lower bound can be derived
in a similar way.
To show that average prices can also attain the upper bound, assume that
all upstream capital is concentrated in one ﬁrm, and that the downstream
capital is split equally among D downstream ﬁrms. Then, qud/Qd =1and












=1 /D for all (u,d).A s
D →∞ , qud/Qu → 0 for all (u,d).
Proposition 6
For each economy s, select an equilibrium contract structure (q(s),p(s))
that is socially eﬃcient, and assume that qud (s) → 0. The sequence of Wal-
rasian prices p∗ (s) is characterized by p∗
ud (s)=r/2−(∂Cd (q(s))/∂qud)/2+




















29A c c o r d i n gt ot h eM e a nV a l u eT h e o r e m ,Cd (q(s)) − Cd (q(s)\qud =0 ) =
∂Cd(q(s)\e qud(s))
∂qud qud (s) for some e qud (s) ∈ (0,q ud (s)) and the equivalent applies












∂Cu (q(s)\e qud (s))
∂qud
. (31)
Since qud (s) → 0,i tf o l l o w st h a te qud (s) → qud (s), which proves the proposi-
tion.
Proposition 7
Assume now that both upstream and downstream ﬁrms are price takers
on the intermediate goods market. Upstream ﬁrms will chose qud to sat-
isfy pud − ∂Cu (qu)/∂qud =0 .D o w n s t r e a m ﬁrms will chose qud to sat-
isfy rud (q)+
PU
i=1 qid∂rid (q)/∂qud − ∂Cd (q)/∂qud − pud =0 . Substituting
pud = ∂Cu (qu)/∂qud into the second equation yields the ﬁrst order condition
for bilateral eﬃciency.
30